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Protecting Johnny Football®: Trademark
Registration for Collegiate Athletes
By Christie Cho*
While the issue of publicity rights for college athletes has intensified, “Johnny Football”
illustrates a different property interest for student athletes, one that is independent from
the rights of the NCAA. Trademark protection for symbols, names, and other marks
affiliated with student-athletes provides an intriguing solution, especially at a time when
the future of amateur college sports is uncertain. Furthermore, the availability of the
“intent to use” application makes trademark registration a viable means of protecting
intellectual property interests of student-athletes. This Comment uses “Johnny Football”
as an example to illustrate this potential game-changer in defining and protecting the
rights of student-athletes, regardless of the future of amateurism in collegiate athletics.
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INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

In 2012, Johnny Manziel became the first freshman to win the Heisman Trophy,
adding to his growing notoriety as one of the most exciting quarterbacks in college
football. As media scrutiny and expectations intensified, Johnny Manziel, his family, and
his university sought to trademark the nickname that had become synonymous with his
exciting, improvised style of play: “Johnny Football.”1 When Eric Vaughan began
manufacturing t-shirts with the phrase “Keep Calm and Johnny Football,” the family sued
and sought an injunction as well as damages.2 In a surprising twist, the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) ruled that Manziel and his family could keep
any financial awards from the lawsuit, even while Manziel remained a collegiate athlete.
In addition to his on-field accomplishments, Johnny Manziel pioneered—even if
inadvertently—a way for a student-athlete to profit from his fame with the blessing of the
NCAA. However, while the issue of publicity rights for college athletes has intensified,
“Johnny Football” actually illustrates a different property interest for student-athletes,
one that is independent from the rights of the NCAA. Potential trademark protection for
symbols, nicknames, and other marks affiliated with student-athletes is an intriguing
concept, especially at a time when the future of amateur college sports is uncertain. This
Comment analyzes the scope of this property interest and suggests trademark registration,
specifically through the “intent-to-use” application, as a way to protect the individual
property interests of student-athletes.
Part I introduces Johnny Manziel, the “Johnny Football” trademark, and his lawsuit
against a t-shirt manufacturer for trademark infringement. Part II puts the Johnny
Football trademark issue in context, analyzing the emerging and game-changing litigation
surrounding the right of publicity for student-athletes. Part III distinguishes Johnny
Football and the potential for trademark protection for student-athletes from the ongoing
controversy surrounding their right of publicity. Part IV examines the various elements
and requirements of trademark registration and identifies “intent to use” as a viable
means of protecting the intellectual property interests of current student-athletes. Basing
trademark registration on the “intent to use” balances the interests of student-athletes as
both “amateurs” under NCAA regulation and future professional athletes with valuable
personal brands. Finally, this Comment examines the implications of this trademark
approach to college sports in general, especially in light of the current litigation about the
right of publicity.
I.

¶4

THE RISE OF JOHNNY FOOTBALL

Johnny Manziel had not yet completed his freshman season as the quarterback for
the Texas A&M Aggies (Texas A&M) when the university recognized the potential
issues arising from his increasing fame. In addition to sending numerous cease-and-desist
letters to those selling unauthorized “Johnny Football” merchandise, the university
recommended that Manziel’s family apply for trademark protection for the “Johnny

1

Darren Rovell, A&M, Family Covet “Johnny Football,” ESPN (Nov. 11, 2012),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/8619087/johnny-manziel-family-trademark-johnny-football.
2
Complaint, JMAN2 Enters. v. Vaughan, No. 6:13-cv-00158-MHS (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2013).

66

Vol. 13:1]

¶5

¶6

Christie Cho

Football” nickname.3 While collaborating with the Manziel family to trademark his
nickname, Texas A&M officials cited their common goal of preventing unauthorized use
of “Johnny Football,” which could jeopardize Johnny Manziel’s eligibility as an amateur
college athlete.4 On February 2, 2013, JMAN2 Enterprises, LLC, a company registered to
Johnny Manziel’s family, filed a trademark application for “Johnny Football.”5 On
December 31, 2013, the Trademark Office suspended the application due to previously
submitted and still pending applications for “Johnny Football,”6 and for the existence of
similar marks, such as “Johnny Basketball” and “Johnny Baseball.”7
Meanwhile, Eric Vaughan (and others) began selling merchandise bearing the
words “Johnny Football.” Vaughan did not stop manufacturing “Keep Calm and Johnny
Football” t-shirts, even after both Manziel and Texas A&M sent cease-and-desist letters.8
Eventually, JMAN2 Enterprises, the same entity that applied to trademark “Johnny
Football,” filed a lawsuit against Vaughan for trademark infringement and unfair
competition.9 On March 1, 2013, JMAN2 Enterprises also filed suit against Kevin
Doolan, whose company—Cubby Tees—similarly manufactured “Johnny Football” tshirts.10 In both cases, Manziel sought injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages,
but ultimately settled with both Vaughan and Doolan.11
The NCAA ruled that Manziel could keep any financial earnings from the lawsuits
without losing his status as an amateur athlete.12 This decision sparked accusations of an
NCAA-created “loophole.” Could college football boosters now intentionally infringe on
athletes’ trademarks, be sued, and essentially pay the student in “legal” damages?13 Soon
after the decision, the NCAA clarified its stance by specifically exclaiming any such
“orchestrated event between a student-athlete and a booster” as a violation.14 Moreover,
the NCAA noted that even if Manziel’s trademark application were accepted and he
3

Allen Reed, Manziel Mania Prompts Quarterback’s Family to Trademark “Johnny Football,” THE
EAGLE (Nov. 17, 2012), http://www.theeagle.com/news/local/article_85bb1ade-1e0e-5a26-a492d1d598b87e29.html.
4
Id.
5
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,839,336 (filed Feb. 2, 2013).
6
The Kenneth R. Reynolds Family Investments filed for the “Johnny Football” mark three months
before JMAN2 Enterprises’ application. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,769,563 (filed Nov. 1,
2012). However, the Patent and Trademark Office sent a final office action to the Kenneth R. Reynolds
Family Investments refusing registration because the “Johnny Football” referred to a living person and the
applicant did not have the written consent of the individual to which “Johnny Football” refers. Office
Action, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,769,563 (issued Mar. 20, 2014).
7
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,791,489 (filed Nov. 30, 2012); U.S. Trademark Application
Serial No. 85,791,517 (filed Nov. 30, 2012).
8
Complaint, JMAN2 Enters. v. Vaughan, No. 6:13-cv-00158-MHS (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2013).
9
Id.
10
Complaint, JMAN2 Enters. v. Doolan, No. 6:13-cv-00215 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2013).
11
Jeff Mosier, Johnny Manziel’s Family Settle T-Shirt Lawsuit, DALL. NEWS (Nov. 1, 2013), http://the
scoopblog.dallasnews.com/2013/11/johnny-manziels-family-settle-t-shirt-lawsuit.html/.
12
Darren Rovell, Suit Claims Nickname Infringement, ESPN (Feb. 23, 2013), http://espn.go.com/coll
ege-football/story/_/id/8977054/lawsuit-filed-claims-johnny-football-infringement.
13
See Ira Boudway, Johnny Football and the NCAA Loophole, BUS. WK. (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.
businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-27/johnny-football-and-the-ncaa-loophole; see also Mark Helm, Did
Johnny Manziel’s Lawsuit Create a Loophole to Pay Athletes?, AL.COM (Feb. 25, 2013),
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/02/did_johnny_manziels_lawsuit_cr.html.
14
Andy Staples, NCAA Rules Clarification Closes Johnny Football “Loophole,” SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Feb. 26, 2013), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/college-football/news/20130226/johnny-manziel-ncaaloophole.
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prevailed in court, neither he nor Texas A&M could directly profit from his trademark as
long as he remained a student-athlete. Johnny Manziel eventually declared for the 2014
National Football League (NFL) Draft, where the Cleveland Browns selected him in the
first round.15
II.
¶7

¶8

THE NCAA’S STRUGGLE TO BALANCE AMATEURISM AND
PUBLICITY RIGHTS OF STUDENT-ATHLETES

During a time already fraught with tension between the NCAA and studentathletes,16 Johnny Manziel intensified the growing discourse about the rights and
exploitation of college athletes. Shortly before the start of his much-anticipated
sophomore season, the NCAA began to investigate allegations that Manziel had accepted
a five-figure sum of money in exchange for his autographs, which would clearly violate
NCAA policies.17 While acknowledging a lack of evidence that Manziel received
compensation for autographs, the NCAA nonetheless suspended him for half of a game,
asserting that Manziel should have known that numerous autographs in one signing
session might be sold commercially.18 In doing so, the NCAA affirmed its stance that
student-athletes must not only abstain from profiting from their fame, but must also take
affirmative measures to prevent others from commercializing on their fame.19
For many, this investigation highlighted the absurdity and hypocrisy of the
NCAA’s stance. Some suggested that the pending lawsuit against the NCAA by former
student-athletes influenced the NCAA’s decision.20 Others more bluntly criticized the
rationale behind the NCAA’s rule against paying college athletes, especially when Texas
A&M could raise tens of thousands of dollars from Manziel’s presence at a school
fundraiser.21 These critics argue that even if Manziel did sell his autographs, any profit he
would have made would be miniscule compared to the money that the NCAA, Texas

15

Ken Belson, Johnny Manziel to Start Season as Browns’ Backup Quarterback, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/sports/football/browns-to-start-brian-hoyer-over-johnnymanziel.html.
16
In yet another escalation of the conflict between the NCAA and student-athletes, football players at
Northwestern University filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board to unionize. The NCAA
responded that such efforts undermined the educational mission of college sports. Zac Ellis, Northwestern
Football Players Seek to Unionize: What Does the Development Mean?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 28,
2014), http://college-football.si.com/2014/01/28/northwestern-football-kain-colter-labor-union/.
17
See Daniel Uthman, Report: Johnny Manziel Accepted Money for Autographs, USA TODAY (Aug. 5,
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/sec/2013/08/04/texas-am-aggies-johnny-manzielmoney-for-autographs/2617413/.
18
See George Schroeder, “No Evidence” Manziel Took Money for Autographs, A&M Says, USA TODAY
(Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/sec/2013/08/28/johnny-manziel-suspendedfor-first-half-of-texas-am-opener-vs-rice/2723767/.
19
See infra text accompanying notes 25 and 26.
20
See, e.g., Alicia Jessop, A Different Take on Johnny Manziel’s Half-Game Suspension, FORBES (Aug.
31, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2013/08/31/a-different-take-on-johnny-manziels-halfgame-suspension/ (“[O]ne has to question whether the light penalty imposed against Manziel . . . was an
NCAA maneuver to pad itself against future personality rights lawsuits.”).
21
Texas A&M sold seats at a table with Manziel at a fundraising banquet. Dan Wetzel, NCAA Probe of
Johnny Manziel Raises Questions About Amateurism Rules, YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug. 4, 2013), http://sports.
yahoo.com/news/ncaaf--ncaa-probe-of-johnny-manziel-raises-questions-about-amateurism-rules230350855.html (“The investigation into Manziel . . . shines an even brighter spotlight on the NCAA’s
system of ‘amateurism’ that is under significant attack both legally and politically.”).
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A&M, and their licensing partners make from student-athletes like Johnny Manziel.22
Simply stated, many believe that it is the sheer amount of money at stake in college
sports that “makes the continued ‘amateur’ status of the players so untenable.”23
A.
¶9

NCAA Bylaws

Section 12 of the NCAA Bylaws codifies amateurism in college sports. A studentathlete is ineligible if he or she “[a]ccepts any remuneration for or permits the use of his
or her name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale of a
commercial product.”24 Furthermore, the NCAA requires student-athletes to proactively
prevent unauthorized commercial use of his or her name:
If a student-athlete’s name or picture appears on commercial items (e.g.,
T-shirts, sweatshirts . . .) or is used to promote a commercial product sold
by an individual or agency without the student-athlete’s knowledge or
permission, the student-athlete (or the institution acting on behalf of the
student-athlete) is required to take steps to stop such an activity in order to
retain his or her eligibility for intercollegiate athletics.25

This provision has recently come under fire for placing too heavy a burden on studentathletes, who not only cannot profit from their fame, but must also ensure that others
refrain from doing so as well.26 As long as student-athletes have this affirmative duty to
prevent commercial use of their images, however, they have an interest in seeking
protection for such marketable aspects of their identities.
¶10
Meanwhile, the NCAA, the Bowl Championship Series (BCS), Texas A&M, their
partner businesses, and sports-news outlets such as ESPN can profit from the studentathlete’s name because of the Student-Athlete Statement (the Statement). By signing the
Statement, the student-athlete not only affirms that he meets the amateur-status
requirement, but also acknowledges the following: “You authorize the NCAA . . . to use
your name or picture in accordance with NCAA Bylaw 12.5, including to promote
NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs.”27 This Statement
essentially gives the NCAA exclusive control over the name and image of studentathletes, which the NCAA can then license to its member organizations and business
22

Id.
Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., Johnny Football’s Payday, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/09/07/opinion/nocera-johnny-footballs-payday.html. But see Sally Jenkins, NCAA Touts Amateurism
Rules over Open Market, but Which Is More Corrupt?, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.washing
tonpost.com/sports/colleges/ncaa-touts-amateurism-rules-over-open-market-but-which-is-more-corrupt/
2013/09/20/511e18ea-2204-11e3-a358-1144dee636dd_story.html (predicting some of the “awful
consequence[s] of an open market” replacing the NCAA’s amateurism model).
24
ACADEMIC & MEMBERSHIP AFFAIRS STAFF, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL § 12.5.2.1 (2013) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
25
Id. § 12.5.2.2.
26
See Complaint, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 4:2009cv03329 (N.D. Cal. July 21,
2009); see also Dan Wetzel, Johnny Manziel’s Suspension Exposes Ridiculousness of NCAA’s Double
Standards, YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug. 28, 2013), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/ncaaf--johnny-manziel-ssuspension-exposes-ridiculousness-of-ncaa-s-double-standards-012517037.html.
27
FORM 13-3A: STUDENT ATHLETE STATEMENT – NCAA DIVISION I (2013) [hereinafter STUDENTATHLETE STATEMENT] (otherwise known as Form 08-3a).
23
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partners. Citing the Statement’s far-reaching implications, some critics argue that this
agreement between the NCAA and student-athletes is an unenforceable contract.28
B.

NCAA’s Stance on Amateurism

¶11

Despite the lucrative partnerships and television contracts that the right to studentathletes’ names and images has brought to the NCAA and its member institutions, the
NCAA maintains that it is committed to amateurism.29 Until recently, courts generally
deferred to the NCAA’s authority to define and determine amateur status of studentathletes.30 However, the NCAA’s stance on amateurism is increasingly difficult to defend
in light of the professional level of marketing and revenue generated for and by college
football and basketball.31 Salaries of coaches, athletic directors, and other administrators
have increased dramatically.32 Annually, the BCS receives more than $150 million for
broadcast rights to BCS bowl games,33 while the NCAA gets $700 million for the rights
to the “March Madness” tournament.34 Moreover, college athletic departments directly
feature college athletes in advertising campaigns, some of which air during national
broadcasts of college football games.
¶12
Meanwhile, student-athletes, often living in poverty,35 are prohibited from
accepting extra benefits, even though athletic scholarships do not cover the full cost of
28

See Kristal S. Stippich & Kadence A. Otto, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far? An Analysis of the
Enforceability of Student-Athlete Consent to Use of Name & Likeness, 20 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 151,
172 (2010) (arguing that the NCAA’s Student-Athlete Statement is unenforceable because it is an adhesion
contract which student-athletes enter into under duress). But see Kendall K. Johnson, Enforceable Fair and
Square: The Right of Publicity, Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete Contracts, 19 SPORTS LAW.
J. 1, 47–48 (2012) (arguing that the Student-Athlete Statement is enforceable because it is not the role of
courts to ensure contracts are fair).
29
Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Aug. 27, 2014); see Zachary
Stauffer, NCAA President Defends Amateurism in College Sports, PBS FRONTLINE (June 19, 2014, 11:11
PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sports/money-and-march-madness/ncaa-president-defendsamateurism-in-college-sports/.
30
See Brian Welch, Comment, Unconscionable Amateurism: How the NCAA Violates Antitrust by
Forcing Athletes to Sign Away Their Image Rights, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 533, 541 (2011) (“[T]he
aggregate effect of [NCAA v.] Board of Regents and the decisions that followed was to allow the notion of
amateurism to become a viable defense of justification for any anti-competitive NCAA rules in the face of
an antitrust challenge.”).
31
The 2009 complaint in the O’Bannon suit against the NCAA details the various sources of revenue for
the NCAA and its member schools, which include jersey sales, media rights to broadcast games,
merchandise sales, and rebroadcasts of “classic games.” Complaint at 104, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n., No. 4:2009cv03329 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2009).
32
College Football Coaches Salaries Database, USA TODAY (July 1, 2013, 12:34 PM), http://www.usa
today.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2012/11/19/ncaa-college-football-head-coach-salary-database/1715543/.
33
Chris Smith, The Money Behind the BCS National Championship, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2013, 4:09 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/01/07/the-money-behind-the-bcs-national-championship/.
34
Curtis Eichelberger, NCAA Play in March Proving Madness Without College Profit, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 20, 2013, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-21/ncaa-play-in-march-provingjust-madness-without-college-windfall.html.
35
Arian Foster pointed out the injustice of such a system in an interview for an upcoming documentary.
After playing in a 100,000-seat stadium, he and his teammates did not have money to buy dinner and their
coach bought them some food, technically in violation of NCAA rules. He also recalled seeing his coach’s
brand new luxury car the next day. Chip Patterson, Arian Foster: “I Was Getting Money on the Side” at
Tennessee, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 20, 2013, 2:13 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-oncollege-football/23750851/arian-foster-i-was-getting-money-on-the-side-at-tennessee; see also Gregg
Doyel, Time to Pay College Football Players: Changing Times, Money Say So, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 25,
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attending college and demanding practice schedules preclude collegiate athletes from
working even part-time jobs. Worse yet, current and former student-athletes end up with
medical bills stemming from athletic injuries.36 The class action lawsuit, led by former
basketball player Ed O’Bannon, encapsulates the resulting tension between the NCAA
and student-athletes who have made lucrative television and licensing deals possible.37
C.

Former Student-Athletes Sue NCAA

¶13

In May 2009, former University of Nebraska quarterback Sam Keller filed a class
action lawsuit against Electronic Arts (EA),38 the NCAA, and the Collegiate Licensing
Company (CLC) for misappropriating the name and likeness of student-athletes in
videogames.39 Shortly thereafter, Ed O’Bannon, who played basketball at the University
of California, Los Angeles, brought a class action lawsuit against the NCAA and CLC for
antitrust and unjust enrichment claims.40 After the two lawsuits were consolidated in
March 2010, current student-athletes joined the class action as named plaintiffs.41
¶14
While EA and CLC settled with the plaintiffs,42 the NCAA refused, instead
choosing to defend its stance in court,43 leaving a decision with huge implications for
college sports to the hands of a single judge.44 On August 8, 2014, Judge Claudia Wilken
2013, 9:39 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/general/writer/gregg-doyel/23838595/its-time-pay-collegefootball-players-changing-times-money-say-so (noting drastic changes in “the business of college football,”
except in the compensation of players).
36
See Complaint at 169, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 4:2009cv03329 (N.D. Cal.
July 21, 2009) (“[M]any former student-athletes have continuing medical bills and treatments resulting
from their participation in intercollegiate athletics . . . [which] can continue long after the conclusion of a
student athlete’s collegiate sports career.”).
37
During the 2013 college football season, several players adorned the letters “A.P.U.”—short for “All
Players United”—to show their support for the players in the O’Bannon lawsuit and to urge for NCAA
reform. Chip Patterson, All Players United Campaign Launched with “APU” on Wrist Tape, CBS SPORTS
(Sept. 21, 2013, 4:46 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/23769680/
all-players-united-campaign-launched-with-apu-on-wrist-tape.
38
Electronic Arts (EA) makes the NCAA Football, NCAA Basketball, and NCAA March Madness
videogames. These games feature digital players with similar physical features, hometowns, and jersey
numbers as their real-life counterparts. Moreover, consumers can download and integrate actual college
team rosters into the game. See, e.g., GAMEROSTERS, http://www.gamerosters.com (last visited Oct. 5,
2014).
39
Complaint at 61, Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 4:09-cv-01967-CW (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009).
40
Complaint, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, No. 4:2009cv03329 (N.D. Cal. July 21,
2009).
41
See Steve Berkowitz, Judge Will Allow Current Player to Join O’Bannon Suit, USA TODAY (July 5,
2013, 6:24 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/07/05/ed-obannon-ncaa-likenesslawsuit/2492981/.
42
In the right of publicity cases against EA, courts determined that the use of player likenesses in a
videogame did not constitute “transformative use.” Hart v. Elec. Arts, 717 F.3d 141, 166 (3d Cir. 2013); In
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[EA’s
use] literally recreates Keller in the very setting in which he has achieved renown.”), aff’g Keller v. Elec.
Arts, No. C 09-1967 CW (Feb. 8, 2010). See also Players to Receive $40 Million, ESPN (Sept. 28, 2013,
9:02 AM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/9731696/ea-sports-clc-settle-lawsuits-40-millionsource.
43
Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Vows to Fight O’Bannon Suit to the Supreme Court, USA TODAY (Sept. 26,
2013, 3:13 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2013/09/26/ncaa-ed-obannon-ea-sportslawsuit-supreme-court/2877579/.
44
Jonathan Mahler, The Lawsuit That Could Bring down the NCAA, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2013, 6:00
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-02/the-lawsuit-that-could-bring-down-the-ncaa.html.
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of the Northern District of California ruled in favor of the current and former college
athletes, determining that “the challenged NCAA rules unreasonably restrain trade in the
market for certain education and athletic opportunities offered by NCAA Division I
schools.”45 The NCAA could fulfill its goals of providing educational opportunities and
promoting intercollegiate competition through less restrictive means, such as by
providing a stipend to cover the full cost of attendance or a trust fund to distribute to
former collegiate athletes their share of the licensing revenue.46 By rejecting the NCAA’s
traditional amateurism defense for its anticompetitive practices, Judge Wilken “delivered
a decisive and crushing end to the era of amateurism in college athletics.”47 Although the
NCAA is appealing the decision, reversal seems unlikely.48
¶15
This decision highlights the need to clarify the contours of collegiate-athletes’
intellectual property rights, which the athletes may now assert themselves in certain
circumstances. Moreover, despite the contentious legal battle, the parties all agree on one
thing: student-athletes do have an intellectual property interest that is separable from that
of the NCAA and its member institutions. For example, the NCAA recognizes that
certain aspects of a student-athlete’s image belong solely to the student-athlete, and
forbids its member schools from selling jerseys or other merchandise bearing the actual
names of student-athletes.49 Furthermore, the NCAA stopped selling even nameless
jerseys through its website, and admitted that it “probably never should have been in the
business” of selling player merchandise in the first place.50
III.
¶16

WHY TRADEMARK PROTECTION?

If Judge Wilken’s decision in O’Bannon undermined the NCAA’s case for
amateurism, then the Johnny Football trademark saga both defines additional intellectual
property rights for student-athletes and provides a potential framework for dealing with
such rights within the evolving college-sports model. Regardless of how the NCAA
appeals or implements Judge Wilken’s decision, trademark law provides a relatively
uncontroversial, partial solution to the increasingly hostile and high-stakes debate over
the intellectual property rights of collegiate athletes.
45

O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 955 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014).
Id. at 1007–08.
47
Stewart Mandel, O’Bannon Ruling Deals Crushing End to Amateurism in NCAA Athletics, FOX
SPORTS (Aug. 9, 2014, 12:08 AM), http://www.foxsports.com/college-football/story/o-bannon-decisiondeals-decisive-end-to-amateurism-in-ncaa-athletics-080814.
48
See id.
49
See Andy Staples, Online Jersey Sales Highlight NCAA’s Hypocrisy on Amateurism, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (May 28, 2014), http://www.si.com/college-football/2013/08/07/jersey-ncaa-sales-manzielclowney.
50
Until August 2013, the NCAA sold, through its website, jerseys with jersey numbers, but omitted the
names of student-athletes. However, Jay Bilas of ESPN exposed the direct linking of jerseys with searches
for specific player names. Upon searching for “Manziel,” the NCAA online store displayed Texas A&M
jerseys with the number “2”—Johnny Manziel’s jersey number. Jay Bilas, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/
JayBilas/status/364809647498088448 (Aug. 6, 2013, 11:06 AM). Bilas repeated the search with names of
other prominent college football players, such as A.J. McCarron and Marqise Lee, which yielded similar
results. The NCAA ceased selling team and individual player merchandise on its website. NCAA president
Mark Emmert admitted the perceived hypocrisy of the NCAA’s online jersey sales. Mark Schlabach,
NCAA Puts End to Jersey Sales, ESPN (Aug. 9, 2013, 1:10 PM), http://espn.go.com/collegesports/story/_/id/9551518/ncaa-shuts-site-jersey-sales-says-hypocritical.
46
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A.

Other Proposals to Reform the Collegiate-Sports Model

¶17

Even after Judge Wilken’s decision, proposed resolutions for the publicity-rights
dilemma in college sports involve extensive reform of NCAA policy, either internally or
through further judicial or legislative action. One such solution is the notion of “pay-forplay,” which would upend the NCAA’s amateurism model.51 However, some argue that
the increased commercialization of college football has already compromised this
model’s utility. The fact that most schools fund nonrevenue-generating sports, such as
most women’s sports, with revenue from football and basketball creates further
problems.52 Paying players would diminish the funds available for these nonrevenuegenerating sports.53 Ultimately, “pay-for-play” raises more questions than it answers,
such as how much to pay the athletes and whether the NCAA should pay certain athletes
more than others.54
¶18
A popular solution is the “Olympic Model,” which would allow student-athletes to
solicit endorsement deals similar to those signed by Olympians.55 Commercial sponsors
would pay student-athletes for their fame and marketability. However, even the Olympic
Model requires drastic changes to the NCAA’s definition of amateurism and its defense
thereof, which prohibits benefits stemming from a student’s collegiate-athlete status.
Most importantly, Judge Wilken’s decision preserved the NCAA’s right to prohibit such
commercial endorsements.56 Thus, a unilateral change of heart by the NCAA is
ultimately unlikely, especially given its unrelenting position prohibiting compensation for
a collegiate athlete’s likeness.57
¶19
Another proposal calls for the establishment of a trust fund for former studentathletes,58 which Judge Wilken considers a “less restrictive” alternative to the NCAA’s
current anticompetitive practices.59 However, the NCAA could both cap the amount held
in the trust and require that its member schools offer the same trust fund amount to each

51

See Mary Grace Miller, Comment, The NCAA and the Student-Athlete: Reform Is on the Horizon, 46
U. RICH. L. REV. 1141, 1169 (2012) (“The pure pay-for-play measure seems unworkable if the NCAA is to
maintain a sense of amateurism at all.”).
52
Steve Berkowitz, Most NCAA Division I Athletic Departments Take Subsidies, USA TODAY (July 1,
2013, 12:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/07/ncaa-finances-subsidies/
2142443/.
53
Id.
54
Charles McClelland, athletic director at Texas Southern University, remarked, “I can’t see the NCAA
passing any legislation to allow additional pay just based on revenue-producing sports, knowing all the
other sports would be adversely affected. Instead, they would have to come up with some kind of formula
that would work for all student-athletes, male and female, versus just those programs that are making
money.” Mechelle Voepel, Title IX a Pay-for-Play Roadblock, ESPN (July 15, 2011), http://espn.go.com/
college-sports/story/_/id/6769337/title-ix-seen-substantial-roadblock-pay-play-college-athletics.
55
The Olympic Model would “reconcile the desire to promote athleticism and academics while still
providing students with the opportunity to maintain the rights to his or her image and talent.” Miller, supra
note 51, at 1168.
56
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1008 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014).
57
NCAA Files Notice of Appeal in O’Bannon Case, NCAA (Aug. 21, 2014, 3:55 PM), http://www.ncaa.
org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-files-notice-appeal-o%E2%80%99bannon-case.
58
Leslie Wong, Comment, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed O’Bannon Takes on the NCAA for
Infringing on the Former Student-Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1069, 1104 (2010).
59
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007 (“[The NCAA] could also permit schools to hold limited and equal
shares of that licensing revenue [generated from use of student athletes’ likenesses] in trust for the studentathletes until they leave school.”).
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recruit.60 In practice, the capped stipends would merely supplement the total aid provided
to collegiate athletes up to an amount equal to the actual cost of attending college.
Moreover, since the trust structure could require all members of a team to receive the
same amount from the trust, the stipends may not reflect the relative fame, marketability,
and intellectual property interests of each athlete.
B.

Distinguishing “Johnny Football” from the O’Bannon Case

¶20

“Johnny Football” highlights a separate kind of intellectual property right protected
by trademark law. A trademark like “Johnny Football” would be unique to a single
individual and not generally applicable to the rest of the team. When the NCAA allowed
Manziel to keep any proceeds from the lawsuit while still playing college football, the
NCAA recognized Manziel’s property interest belonging solely to Manziel. For instance,
according to Shane Hinckley, assistant vice president of business development at Texas
A&M, “[E]veryone felt that if anybody should have ownership of this [trademark], it’s
Johnny or his family.”61
¶21
Further, the nature of a trademark-registerable nickname like “Johnny Football”
presents an inherently different kind of property right than that claimed by the plaintiffs
in O’Bannon. Even if the plaintiffs prevailed in the class action, a damages determination
of how much money players would be entitled to receive from the videogames would be
necessary.62 While EA’s videogames may have improperly invoked the identity of actual
collegiate athletes, the games also utilized jerseys, stadiums, and school colors—all of
which represent intellectual property rights of the university and/or the NCAA—to
enhance the realism of the game. In fact, the court in Hart v. EA noted that the use of
college athletes’ identifiable features in the context of a simulated college football game,
including the Rutgers jersey worn by the virtual quarterback, made the games less
transformative, thus finding in favor of the plaintiff.63
¶22
Meanwhile, the Johnny Football trademark can exist wholly separate from any
trademarks of Texas A&M, the Southeastern Conference (SEC), or the NCAA. Texas
A&M intervened only after finding that approximately 20% of the Johnny Football
contraband merchandise also infringed on Texas A&M’s marks.64 According to Shane
Hinckley, the Johnny Football phenomenon is a “three-headed monster” that involves
Manziel’s likeness, his intellectual property rights, and the school’s intellectual property
rights.65 The first of the “three-headed monster,” Manziel’s likeness, is protected under
60

Id. at 1008 (“[T]he NCAA may enact and enforce rules ensuring that no school may offer a recruit a
greater share of licensing revenue than it offers any other recruit in the same class on the same team.”).
61
Scott Soshnick, NCAA Handcuffs Family Use While Johnny Football Seeks Trademark, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-14/johnny-football-seeks-trademark-whilencaa-handcuffs-family-use.html.
62
See Steve Berkowitz, Distributing $40 Million EA Settlement Looks Complex, USA TODAY (Sept. 27,
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/09/27/ed-obannon-sam-keller-ea-courtsettlement-payment/2886069/.
63
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 166 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Not only does the digital avatar match
Appellant in terms of hair color, hair style and skin tone, but the avatar’s accessories mimic those worn by
Appellant during his time as a Rutgers player.”).
64
Andy Staples, NCAA Rules Clarification Closes Johnny Football “Loophole,” SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Feb. 26, 2013), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/college-football/news/20130226/johnny-manziel-ncaaloophole.
65
Id.
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the right of publicity doctrine.66 Manziel also has intellectual property rights extending
beyond this right of publicity. Trademark law protects these intellectual property interests
by allowing student-athletes like Manziel to assert their claims on the marks and designs
that they have made famous. Trademark law similarly protects universities’ intellectual
property interests.67
¶23
Finally, envisioning the identities of student-athletes as discrete trademarks (or
potential trademarks) does not require any changes to the NCAA’s current amateurism
rules. Even if the O’Bannon case or other developments in college athletics lead to
compensation of current student-athletes, trademark protection could still play an
important role. For example, if the NCAA were to permit student-athletes to pursue
endorsement or marketing opportunities, famous marks and nicknames like Johnny
Football would be valuable assets in such marketing campaigns. Ultimately, trademark
protection for these nicknames or phrases ensures that the student-athlete continues to
own and control the commercial use of such marks.68
IV. PROTECTION UNDER TRADEMARK LAW
¶24

While Manziel applied to register the Johnny Football mark, registration is not
necessary for trademark protection. Trademark protection finds its roots in common
law,69 which limits protection to “the extent people are made aware of it and placed on
notice,” taking into account factors like geographic region and industry.70 Moreover,
establishing a common law right to a mark requires “win[ning] the race to the
marketplace” and being the first to use the mark in commerce.71 State trademark laws and
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act protect marks that are not registered federally.
¶25
The Lanham Act72 allows for federal registration of trademarks used in interstate
commerce. This effectively expands the territorial limits of common-law trademark
rights, since federal registration “creates a presumption that the registrant is entitled to
use the registered mark throughout the nation,”73 and serves as “public notice of [one’s]
claim of ownership of the mark.”74 Other advantages of federal registration include use of
the registration symbol “®” and federal court jurisdiction.75 But substantively, a federally
66

In the right of publicity cases against EA, courts determined that the use of player likenesses in a
videogame did not constitute “transformative use.” Hart, 717 F.3d at 166; In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[EA’s use] literally recreates
Keller in the very setting in which he has achieved renown.”), aff’g Keller v. Elec. Arts, No. C 09-1967
CW (Feb. 8, 2010).
67
TEXAS A&M AGGIES, Registration No. 3,970,755.
68
See infra text accompanying notes 83–88 for discussion of trademark “use in commerce.”
69
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (“The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to
distinguish the goods or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all
other persons, has been long recognized by the common law . . . and by the statutes of some of the States. It
is a property right for the violation of which damages may be recovered in an action at law . . . .”).
70
22 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 623 (1993).
71
Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
72
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
73
Draeger Oil Inc. v. Uno-Ven Co., 314 F.3d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b)
(2012)).
74
Frequently Asked Questions, USPTO (Apr. 23, 2013, 10:26 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/faq/
trademarks.jsp#_Toc275426681.
75
Id.
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registered trademark provides essentially the same rights as those found under state
statutes or common law.76
A.

Distinctiveness

¶26

Marks, in order to receive trademark protection, must be distinctive and “are often
classified in categories of generally increasing distinctiveness; . . . they may be (1)
generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.”77 Suggestive,
arbitrary, and fanciful marks are inherently distinctive, while descriptive marks require a
secondary meaning in order to qualify as “distinctive.”78 A person’s name can also
qualify for trademark protection if it has acquired a secondary meaning.79
¶27
Professional athletes have sought and received trademark protection for recognized
nicknames and phrases. For instance, Darrelle Revis received trademark registration for
his nickname “Revis Island,”80 while Colin Kaepernick registered the term
“Kaepernicking,” which refers to his signature celebratory gesture.81 And former Baylor
University quarterback Robert Griffin III applied for trademark registration for his
famous initials “RGIII.”82 Concerning Mr. Griffin’s mark, the Trademark Office
published his applied-for marks in its Official Gazette, which is usually a precursor to
registration. Importantly, the Office has not suggested that marks derived from athletes’
names or nicknames lack distinctiveness.
B.
¶28

Use and Intent to Use

An application for trademark protection must also demonstrate current use or the
intent to use the mark in commerce in the future. To be “used in commerce,” the mark “is
placed in any manner on the goods or on their containers or the displays associated
therewith . . . [and] the goods are sold or transported in commerce.”83 For services, the
mark should be “used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services.”84 Requiring
actual use of marks prevents “banking” or “warehousing”85 of marks by applicants, and
grants protection for marks that “help consumers identify the source” of the trademark.86
Congress buttressed this requirement by “making clear that the trademark rights can be
conveyed only through ‘the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and

76

See Tarin v. Pellonari, 625 N.E.2d 739, 745–46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); see also Zazu Designs, 979 F.2d
at 503 (“Registration modifies [common law] system slightly, allowing slight sales plus notice in the
register to substitute for substantial sales without notice.”).
77
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)).
78
1-2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.01 (Matthew Bender ed., 2014).
79
Id. § 2.03.
80
REVIS ISLAND, Registration No. 77,907,325.
81
KAEPERNICKING, Registration No. 85,822,700.
82
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,518,373 (filed Jan. 17, 2012).
83
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Brookfield Commc’ns., Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 1999)
(discussing how West Coast’s emails to lawyers and clients were not “sufficient to create an association
among the public”).
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not [use] made merely to reserve a mark.’”87 Such use “is based entirely on association of
the mark in the public mind with a particular product, regardless of how that association
is achieved.”88 This will and should depend on the standards and “practices of the
industry involved.”89
¶29
When an application for trademark protection is based on “intent to use,” the
applicant must file an intent-to-use statement, which establishes the applicant’s priority as
to the date of filing.90 The applicant then must file a statement-of-use within six months
to demonstrate actual use, though the applicant may request additional time to file this
statement.91 According to the Lanham Act:
The Director shall extend, for one additional 6-month period, the time for
filing the statement of use . . . upon written request of the applicant before
the expiration of the 6-month period provided in paragraph (1). In addition
to an extension under the preceding sentence, the Director may, upon a
showing of good cause by the applicant, further extend the time for filing
the statement of use under paragraph (1) for periods aggregating not more
than 24 months.92
The applicant’s intent must be bona fide, which is measured by “objective factors”93 that
are “specific, concrete steps an applicant has either planned or taken leading to the
ultimate introduction of a commercial product.”94
¶30
Even after registration, a mark may lose trademark protection through
abandonment, which requires both “non-use and intent not to resume use.”95 However,
three consecutive years of non-use creates “prima facie abandonment,” or “a rebuttable
presumption of abandonment.”96 To prevent this, owners must use marks in a nontrivial
and non-sporadic manner sufficient to maintain public recognition of the mark and its
ownership.97 This is consistent with the policy behind the Lanham Act, which “prevents

87

Id. at 1051 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
Marvel Comics Ltd. v. Defiant, 837 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
89
H.R. REP. NO. 100-1028, at 9 (1988).
90
15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).
91
See DSMR, LLC v. Goldberg, No. 02 c 5203, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4879, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24,
2004).
92
15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (2012).
93
Legislative history of the 1988 amendment to the Lanham Act, which added the option to apply based
on intent to use, clarified the requirement of “bona fide” intent to use a mark:
88

A statement of intent to use a mark on specifically identified products in the future may
be sufficient. An applicant may safely make this statement in its original application
without having taken concrete steps to create and introduce a new product, provided that
in fact it intends to use the mark.
S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 23 (1988).
GILSON LALONDE, supra note 78, § 3.04(2)(c).
95
Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., Inc. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1043 (2d Cir. 1980).
96
Id. at 1044.
97
Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 286, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Stetson v.
Wolf & Assocs., 955 F.2d 847, 850 (2d Cir. 1992)).
94
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entrepreneurs from reserving brand names in order to make their rivals’ marketing more
costly” by requiring actual use of marks.98
C.
¶31

Even after establishing trademark rights, an owner claiming trademark
infringement must establish all of the elements for infringement to prevail,99 which are
the same for registered and unregistered trademarks.100 In determining whether the
elements for infringement are satisfied, courts apply a two-pronged test: “[F]irst whether
the plaintiff’s mark is valid and entitled to protection, and second whether the defendant’s
use of the mark is likely to cause confusion as to the origin of the goods.”101
V.

¶32

APPLYING TRADEMARK LAW TO JOHNNY FOOTBALL AND COLLEGE SPORTS

Although the Johnny Football issue raised many questions and possibilities
concerning collegiate-athlete intellectual property rights, Manziel is neither the first102
nor the last103 athlete to have a potential trademark claim over an aspect of his identity.
Rather, Johnny Football is a helpful test case for examining the availability and
application of trademark protection for student-athletes, providing guidance as to the
distinctiveness and use-in-commerce requirements in this context, as well as to the
implications for those claiming infringement.
A.

¶33

Infringement

Distinctiveness

A mark based on an aspect of a student-athlete’s identity is likely to be sufficiently
distinctive for trademark protection. The Johnny Football mark is either suggestive—
which would be sufficiently distinctive—or descriptive. Even in the latter instance, there
98
99

Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992).
The trademark owner must establish that:
(1) it has a valid mark that is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act; and that (2) the
defendant used the mark, (3) in commerce, (4) “in connection with the sale . . . or
advertising of goods or services” without the plaintiff’s consent. In addition, the plaintiff
must show that defendant’s use of that mark “is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of [defendant] with [plaintiff], or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of [the defendant’s] goods, services, or commercial activities by
[plaintiff].”

1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400, 406–07 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
Id.
101
Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
102
In 2011, Louisiana State University (LSU) star Tyrann Mathieu experienced a similar meteoric rise to
fame as “Honey Badger,” a nickname from a viral YouTube video. See The Crazy Nastyass Honey Badger
(original narration by Randall), YOUTUBE (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4r7wHM
g5Yjg. The compliance office at LSU responded to the unlicensed “Honey Badger” merchandise with
cease-and-desist letters and a warning to fans of the illicit nature of such items. Honey Badger Does Care,
LSU COMPLIANCE (Dec. 7, 2011), http://compliance.lsu.edu/Pages/HoneyBadger.aspx.
103
Even after the lawsuit by Manziel, Cubby Tees still sells shirts bearing the name, nickname, or image
of current college athletes. College Sports Tees, CUBBY TEES, http://www.cubbytees.com/CollegePage.html
(last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
100
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would be a strong case for secondary meaning given the widespread recognition of the
nickname referring to Johnny Manziel.104 While the Trademark Office suspended
Manziel’s application due to the existence of earlier applications for the Johnny Football
mark, the mark did not fail because of a lack of distinctiveness.105
B.
¶34

Use in Commerce

The Trademark Office initially denied Johnny Manziel’s application because the
mark used on the specimen in the application was merely ornamental, and thus “did not
function as a trademark.”106 Manziel might overcome the initial denial by “submit[ting] a
different specimen (a verified-substitute specimen) that was in actual use in commerce at
least as early as the filing date of the application.”107 If he is unable to do so, he has the
remaining options:
(2) Amend to the Supplemental Register, which is a second trademark
register for marks not yet eligible for registration on the Principal Register,
but which may become capable over time of functioning as source
indicators.
(3) Claim acquired distinctiveness [through] . . . proof that applicant’s
extensive use and promotion of the mark allowed consumers now directly
to associate the mark with applicant as the source of the goods.
(4) Submit evidence that the applied-for mark is . . . already recognized as
a source indicator for other goods or services that applicant sells/offers.
(5) Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b).108

¶35

As illustrated above, it is difficult for the student-athlete applicant to demonstrate
“use in commerce” without relying on unlicensed merchandise sold by third parties. Per
NCAA regulations, Manziel could not sell Johnny Football-branded merchandise while
playing football in college.109 Trademark protection, however, requires commercial use.
But the goal of the “use in commerce” requirement is to ensure “sufficient publicity to
identify or distinguish” the mark, or in the alternative, to “create an association of the

104
When the Kenneth R. Reynolds Family Investments applied for the “Johnny Football” trademark, a
letter of protest cited the “lack of consent of a living individual named in the mark” and produced
numerous pieces of evidence to show that “Johnny Football” indeed referred to Johnny Manziel. Letter of
Protest Memorandum, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,769,563 (filed Aug. 16, 2013) (emphasis
added) (on file with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
105
Office Action, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,839,336 (filed May 22, 2013) (on file with
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
106
The mark does not “indicate the source of applicant’s clothing” or “identify and distinguish
applicant’s clothing” because of the placement and size of the mark on the clothing. Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 24, § 12.5.2.2.
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goods” with the mark.110 Accordingly, the use of nicknames, images, and names of
college athletes by the school,111 media, and the athlete himself likely satisfies this goal.
Manziel’s use of his nickname might also be sufficiently commercial in the context
of “the practice of the industry”112 of college athletics, which is strictly governed by the
NCAA. In this case, the “customary practices of a particular industry” include the
NCAA’s prohibition of student-athletes profiting from the use of their nicknames or
marks.113 Since the NCAA currently restricts commercial activity by student-athletes, the
sufficient use of a trademark by a student-athlete might encompass acts beyond simply
making or selling t-shirts with the Johnny Football mark.114
Moreover, a student-athlete’s social media activity may constitute “use in
commerce.” Although neither the student-athlete nor the school may sell merchandise
with marks related to the student, both can utilize social media in building a brand. By
consistently “using” a mark on social media, the student-athlete can strengthen the
association of the mark with himself.115 Regardless of whether the student-athlete seeks
to demonstrate actual use or bona fide intent to use the mark, social media is a beneficial
tool for demonstrating the public’s association of the mark with the athlete.
However, granting Manziel or other similarly situated college-athletes trademark
protection for marks not yet used commercially raises “warehousing” concerns.116 The
applicant or owner of a trademark needs to have more than an “inchoate wish to keep the
mark for some vague, unspecified future use.”117 Even if a collegiate star is undoubtedly
going to become a professional athlete, he may decide not to use an old nickname or
mark from his collegiate days.118 Prematurely granting registration for trademarks before
establishing actual use in commerce would effectively serve as a “reservation” of a
trademark before protection is warranted.119
If Manziel or another collegiate athlete is unable to prove “use in commerce,” he
may consider applying based on his bona fide “intent to use” the mark.120 While the
Lanham Act requires the applicant to show more than a mere desire to reserve a mark, its
110

Marvel Comics Ltd. v. Defiant, 837 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
A&M has released videos on YouTube featuring “Johnny Football.” Texas A&M Athletics, Call Him
Johnny Heisman, YOUTUBE (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hjJ7HPfrIvY; Texas A&M
Athletics, The Amazing Johnny Football, YOUTUBE (Nov. 16, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eG7VMdvNPLA.
112
H.R. REP. NO. 100-1028 (1988).
113
See Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1198 (11th Cir. 2001) (determining
that making software available to the public for free download under a GNU General Public License
constituted sufficient “use in commerce” to establish priority, given the practices of software industry).
114
See id.
115
“Most companies have cottoned on to social media as tools for engagement and collaboration. . . . Of
course, social media can also boost brand awareness, trial, and ultimately sales, especially when a
campaign goes viral.” Patrick Barwise & Seán Meehan, The One Thing You Must Get Right When Building
a Brand, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2010, at 80, 82.
116
See supra text accompanying note 85.
117
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 275, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing the abandonment
doctrine).
118
Tyrann Mathieu distanced himself from his once-synonymous “Honey Badger” nickname upon
entering the NFL. Nate Ulrich, Tyrann Mathieu Discusses Reviving “Honey Badger” Nickname, Whatever
That Means, YAHOO! SPORTS (June 30, 2013), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nfl-shutdown-corner/tyrannmathieu-discusses-reviving-honey-badger-nickname-whatever-145907461.html.
119
See Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992).
120
15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2012).
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legislative history suggests that it may extend to certain situations involving delayed use
of a mark.121 All student-athletes will eventually leave the realm of collegiate athletics
and the NCAA, at which point they are free to pursue commercial ventures using their
name or likeness. Moreover, NCAA regulations do not currently prohibit student-athletes
from taking “specific, concrete steps” towards the “ultimate introduction of a commercial
product” using the applied-for mark.122 Further, athletes tend to use their registered
trademarks for clothing merchandising, which narrows the likely intended use of appliedfor marks.123
¶40
“Intent to use” is especially practical for elite college athletes because of the
typically short duration of their collegiate careers. Players of such fame (or notoriety) are
more likely to be upperclassmen with only one or two years of eligibility remaining.
Even underclassmen like Johnny Manziel may choose to leave early for the NFL, instead
of risking injury or a disappointing senior season in college.124 Similarly, college
basketball stars are eligible for the National Basketball Association (NBA) after their
freshman season, making premature collegial departures even more likely for basketball
players.125
¶41
In sum, the timing and reality of collegiate athletic careers allow student-athletes
like Johnny Manziel to apply for a mark based on his future intent to use; graduate or
depart early to become a professional athlete; and then file a timely statement of actual
commercial use of the mark.126 By default, student-athletes have six months to
demonstrate actual use of their mark in commerce.127 They may also request an automatic
six-month extension, and an additional twenty-four-month extension with a showing of
good cause.128 Together, this gives an applicant a total of thirty-six months to
demonstrate actual use. By delaying commercial use of a registered trademark, studentathletes can preserve their NCAA eligibility by avoiding commercial activity until they
are no longer subject to NCAA regulations.129 The intent-to-use basis for trademark
registration thus allows current college athletes superior intellectual property protection
that is nevertheless consistent with NCAA regulation.
C.
¶42

Infringement

Manziel alleged that Vaughan “ha[d] unfairly competed through false designation
of origin, false representation of sponsorship and affiliation, and infringement of
121

See H.R. REP. NO. 100-1028 (1988); see also S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 23 (1988).
GILSON LALONDE, supra note 78, § 3.04(2)(c).
123
Trademark applications of Colin Kaepernick, Darrelle Revis, and Marshawn Lynch all cited the class
for “clothing” and other apparel in their respective trademark applications. See REVIS ISLAND,
Registration No. 77,907,325; KAEPERNICKING, Registration No. 85,822,700; see also U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 86,059,781 (filed Sept. 8, 2013).
124
In fact, Manziel declared for the NFL draft after his redshirt sophomore season at Texas A&M. See
Belson, supra note 15.
125
Nicole Auerbach, Coach K Worries About One-and-Done in College Game, USA TODAY (Nov. 26,
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2013/11/26/mike-krzyzewski-one-and-done-jabariparker-andrew-wiggins-julius-randle/3761643/.
126
See DSMR v. Goldberg, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4879, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2004).
127
15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1) (2012).
128
Id. § 1051(d)(2).
129
See id.
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Plaintiff’s common law trademark in violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.”130
Since he had not registered the Johnny Football trademark by the time of the lawsuit,
Manziel cited § 43 instead of § 32 of the Lanham Act, which addresses registered
trademarks. Section 43 of the Lanham Act protects unregistered marks by creating civil
liability for false descriptions that are “likely to cause confusion” or mistake concerning
“the affiliation, connection, or association” of the defendant with another person or of
another person’s “sponsorship or approval.”131
While Manziel was an amateur college athlete who could not actually sponsor or
endorse anything, NCAA policies suggest that there is a serious likelihood of confusion
about endorsements by college athletes. Section 12.5.2.2 of the NCAA Bylaws places an
affirmative burden on the student (or his school) to stop the production and sale of
“commercial items” bearing his name or image.132 In order to comply with this rule and
preserve the eligibility of student-athletes, schools like Texas A&M and Louisiana State
University have warned fans about the potential risks posed by unauthorized merchandise
for student-athlete eligibility.133 Such caution suggests that university leaders feel
consumer confusion as to “sponsorship and affiliation” is not only possible, but in fact,
likely.
Moreover, while § 43 protects unregistered trademarks, registration has distinct
advantages. Registration of a mark is “prima facie evidence” of “the registrant’s
ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered mark
in commerce.”134 Registered marks may also become incontestable, which offers
additional assurances and protections for owners of the marks.135 In other words, while
student-athletes may claim infringement of unregistered marks, registration provides
greater security for intellectual property owners if a dispute arises.
Section 2(c) of the Lanham Act further prohibits registration of a trademark that
“consists or comprises of a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living
individual except by his written consent.”136 One could argue that this sufficiently
protects the interests of college athletes because it prevents third parties from registering
a trademark clearly connected to a current college athlete. For the Johnny Football mark,
the Trademark Office raised this concern in response to the application submitted by
Kenneth R. Reynolds Family Investments, and refused registration until the applicant
produced Manziel’s written consent.137
In conclusion, the unavailability of trademark registration may discourage thirdparty commercial use of marks associated with current college athletes. However,
student-athletes can further prevent third parties from using their identities for
commercial gain by filing for trademark registration based on their intent to use.138 In
130

Complaint ¶12, JMAN2 Enters. v. Vaughan, No. 6:13-cv-00158-MHS (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2013).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
132
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 24, § 12.5.2.2.
133
See supra note 102.
134
15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2012).
135
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b).
136
15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) (2012); see In re Sauer, 27 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1073 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (refusing
registration of the mark “Bo Ball” under § 2(c) of the Lanham Act because it contained the name
identifying Bo Jackson).
137
See Letter of Protest Memorandum, supra note 104.
138
See supra text accompanying notes 120–22.
131
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addition to discouraging third parties like Eric Vaughan and Kevin Doolan from
infringing, student-athletes can establish intellectual property rights before they pursue
commercial opportunities available to them after their NCAA careers. Thus, trademark
registration not only protects student-athletes from the unauthorized use of their marks
and identities, but may also provide them with clear intellectual property rights to the
valuable brands that they develop as student-athletes.139
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS IN COLLEGE SPORTS
¶47

Trademark registration is consistent with the NCAA’s current bylaws requiring
students and member colleges to be vigilant of unauthorized, third-party use of studentathlete likenesses. More importantly, it is also consistent with the NCAA’s current
position on amateurism in college athletics. Registration of a well-known college
athlete’s name, nickname, or symbol reflects a claim of ownership consistent with the
NCAA’s stance that a student-athlete ultimately owns the rights to his name.140 It also
serves as notice to sellers of unauthorized merchandise that such ownership claims exist
and infringement thereof carries consequences. Regardless of how O’Bannon affects the
NCAA’s current model, trademark offers a well-defined level of protection for college
athletes as well as a rare instance of consensus between students, schools, and the NCAA.
¶48
Even with the O’Bannon decision, trademark law can supplement any newfound
rights and economic interests of college athletes. In fact, relaxing or abandoning the
NCAA’s amateurism rules—whether in the form of pay-for-play or the Olympic
Model—would make trademarks more important for student-athletes asserting these
rights through trademarks and licensing agreements. Student-athletes would no longer
need to wait until after college to pursue commercial uses of nicknames, images, or
marks. Ultimately, relaxed NCAA rules would make it even more critical for studentathletes to define and establish their intellectual property rights before pursuing branding
and promotional opportunities.
¶49
Moreover, the O’Bannon case concerned a student-athlete’s right of publicity.
Trademark protection, however, may be preferable to the right of publicity in several
ways. First, trademark offers federal protection, while the right of publicity varies from
state to state.141 Under the Lanham Act, “Registration of a mark on the principal
register . . . shall be constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership thereof.”142
Given the national reach of the NCAA, it makes sense to have one uniform approach for
protecting the rights of college athletes.

139

John van der Lult-Drummond, Lessons in Brand Protection from College Football’s Biggest Name,
WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/daily/Detail.aspx
?g=5f5e606b-ade8-4384-acbb-ac8ffccba394&c=5851351 (“The key for Manziel, then, is building and
protecting the brand so it is in a strong position to capitalise once he joins the paid ranks.”).
140
See supra text accompanying notes 49–50, 64–65.
141
But “as the right of publicity has matured, it has been increasingly connected to trademark rights.”
Sheldon W. Halpern, Trafficking in Trademarks: Setting Boundaries for the Uneasy Relationship Between
“Property Rights” and Trademark and Publicity Rights, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1034 (2009). Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act protects against false representation of sponsorship by a celebrity. See id. “To a
fair extent, this use of section 43(a) creates a federal variant of the state law right of publicity.” Id.
142
15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2012).
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¶50

Second, trademark law provides a more clearly established right than the right of
publicity doctrine, which has expanded and contracted since its inception. The right of
publicity emerged as “an outgrowth of the right of privacy.”143 As the right expanded to
the exclusive right to commercialize one’s likeness, courts have struggled to balance the
interests of protecting one’s image from exploitation by others with the right’s rather
humble origins meant to protect individual privacy.144
¶51
Most importantly, modern rationales for the right of publicity do not fit into a
college-sports context. Defenders of the right of publicity argue that it rightfully provides
economic incentives for the celebrity to continue developing the economic benefits of
fame.145 However, college football and basketball stars future-income earning potential is
often initially commensurate with their collegial accomplishments, thus incentivizing
student-athletes to continually develop. Similarly, some argue that the right of publicity
provides validation to the celebrity by allowing her to benefit from the fruit of her own
labor.146 However, the student-athlete benefits from his labor by receiving a scholarship,
which is the extent of the benefits allowed by the NCAA.
¶52
Preventing unjust enrichment also has its place in this discussion.147 Often, fans
bestow nicknames on student-athletes, such as “Honey Badger” and “Johnny Football,”
with little to no creative input from the athletes.148 Moreover, a college athlete’s fame
would not be possible without costly marketing efforts and media coverage, both of
which universities invest in heavily to promote their respective institutions and studentathletes.149
VII. CONCLUSION
¶53

Although the NCAA’s decision to allow Johnny Manziel to keep any financial
gains from his trademark infringement suits caused many to label it a “loophole” in the
NCAA’s amateurism rules, it also suggests a new solution for protecting the rights of
college athletes that is compatible with the goals of amateurism. The advantages of
trademark registration over the contentious and relatively unpredictable right of publicity
doctrine make trademark a better form of protection for college athletes whose names or
143

ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003).
See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2006) (“[Courts have] created a few ad hoc exceptions in cases where
the sweeping logic of the right of publicity seems to lead to results they consider unfair.”).
145
But see id. at 1187 (questioning whether celebrities would invest less energy and talent).
146
See George P. Smith, II, The Extent of Protection of the Individual’s Personality Against Commercial
Use: Toward a New Property Right, 54 S.C. L. REV. 1, 37 (2002).
147
See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the
Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 857–58 (1995) (noting the “economic reality” of
“associative value” of a celebrity’s personality). But see Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public
Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 180–81 (1993) (“[B]eing famous, by
itself, does not make a person deserving of all the fruits of her fame.”).
148
“Johnny Football” was a nickname created by fans at Texas A&M. Chris Huston, Q&A with Johnny
Manziel, CBS SPORTS (Nov. 28, 2012, 5:22 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-oncollege-football/21179344/q--a-with-johnny-manziel. A viral YouTube video inspired fans on an LSU fan
website to associate Tyrann Mathieu with “Honey Badger.” Glenn Gullbeau, Honey Badger Phenomenon
Going Wild for No. 2 LSU, USA TODAY (Oct. 13, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/
football/sec/story/2011-10-11/lsu-honeybadger/50737088/1.
149
See Madow, supra note 147, 189–90.
144

84

Vol. 13:1]

Christie Cho

nicknames carry immense marketing power. Furthermore, trademark registration on an
intent-to-use basis, which allows student-athletes to register a mark but postpone any
commercial activity related to the mark, is consistent with the NCAA’s current policies
regarding amateurism. Thus, trademark registration recognizes the intellectual property
interests of collegiate athletes both as students subject to the amateurism rules of the
NCAA and as future professional athletes with potentially tremendous name-brand value.
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